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Concerns about a worsening “digital divide” between rich and poor countries parallel the 
hope that information and computing technologies (ICTs) could increase economic growth in 
developing countries.  Little research, however, has explored ICT growth beyond noting that it is 
correlated with standard development indicators, and no empirical research has explored the role 
of regulation.  I use data from a unique new survey of telecommunications regulators and other 
sources to measure the effects of regulation on Internet development.  Controlling for factors 
such as income, telecommunications infrastructure development, ubiquity of personal computers, 
and time trends, I find that countries requiring formal regulatory approval for Internet Service 
Providers (ISPs) to operate have fewer Internet users and hosts than countries that do not require 
such approval.  Moreover, countries that regulate ISP final-user prices have higher Internet 
access prices than countries without such regulations.  These results suggest that developing 
countries’ own regulatory policies can have large impacts on the digital divide. 1 
 
I.   Introduction 
 
  As information and communication technologies (ICTs) became ever more ubiquitous in 
the late 1990s, many began to worry about an increasing “digital divide” between rich nations 
and poor.
1  That is, those in rich nations had increasingly better access to ICTs and were using 
them more intensively while poor nations continued to fall further behind.  At the same time, 
many believed that the Internet and ICTs potentially offered developing countries an opportunity 
to increase productivity and economic growth.  These two beliefs have led to many initiatives by 
industrialized countries, NGOs, and international organizations such as the World Bank and the 
UN intended to increase Internet usage and, presumably, bridge the digital divide in developing 
countries. 
  While many of these initiatives mention the importance of competition and regulatory 
structure, few have given it much attention, and almost no research has explored the effects of 
regulation on Internet development.  In this paper I combine data from a new survey of 
regulators, the International Telecommunications Union (ITU), and World Bank statistics to 
estimate the effects of regulation on the Internet in developing countries.  Controlling for factors 
including income, development of the telecommunications network, and number of computers in 
the country, regulations targeted at the Internet were correlated with lower Internet usage, fewer 
Internet hosts, and higher prices for Internet access.  More specifically, countries that require 
formal approval for Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to begin operations had fewer Internet 
users and Internet hosts, while countries that regulate ISP prices have higher prices for Internet 
access.
                                                 
1   There is also concern about so-called “digital divides” within countries, but this paper is concerned with the gap 
between countries.         
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II.   The Digital Divide 
  People in richer countries have better access to ICTs and use them more intensively than 
do people in poorer countries.  Figure 1 shows Internet use over time by countries’ average 
income.  It is clear that Internet usage is far more common in richer countries than in poorer 
countries, and also that the number of users has grown more quickly in richer countries.  The 
torrid pace of technological change—and the ensuing technology bubble—in industrialized 
countries led to the simultaneous concerns that this divide would continue to grow with grave 
consequences, and also that the Internet and new technologies could help stimulate economic 
development (see, for example, Hammond 2001; Ishaq 2001; Norris 2001; Steinmueller 2001). 
  Concerns about consequences of the widening digital divide permeated discussions of 
economic development.  Kofi Anan, for example, said that “People lack many things: jobs, 
shelter, food, health care, and drinkable water.  Today, being cut off from telecommunications 
services is a hardship almost as acute as these other deprivations, and may indeed reduce the 
chances of finding remedies to them” (as quoted in Norris 2001).  The concerns about the digital 
divide have probably been overstated and the potential benefits from ICTs over-hyped.  Kenny 
(2002), for example, notes that the likely impact of any particular technology is likely to be 
small,
2 and Pohjola (2002) finds little correlation between ICT investments and economic growth 
in 42 developing countries from 1985-1999. 
Nonetheless, there is evidence that ICTs can improve productivity and economic growth 
in developing countries.  Clarke (2002), for example, using enterprise-level data in Eastern 
European transition economies, finds that even controlling for endogeneity, firms that have 
                                                 
2   While any given technology is unlikely to have a major impact on economic growth, some innovations become 
“general purpose technologies” that do generate a burst of productivity and economic growth (e.g., Bresnahan and 
Trajtenberg 1992; Helpman 1998; Rosenberg and Trajtenberg 2001).  Whether certain ICTs are general purpose 
technologies is still a matter of debate.         
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Internet access are more likely to export than firms that do not.
3  Bhavani (2002) finds that use of 
technology is beneficial for firms in the Indian auto components industry.  Moreover, ICTs—or, 
more accurately, involvement in ICT industries—have also been important in spurring regional 
economic growth in places such as Taiwan and Bangalore (Arora, et al. 2001; Athreye 2002; 
Saxenian and Hsu 2000). 
  In response to the concerns and hopes, a wide range of organizations established 
initiatives to “bridge the digital divide.”  As Heeks (2002) put it, “donors, attracted by a 
combination of the hype and hope generated by ICTs have altered their funding priorities and 
pushed ICTs up the development agenda.”
4  These initiatives include, but are not limited to, the 
United Nations Information and Communication Technologies Task Force, the Digital 
Opportunities Task Force created by the G8 and administered by the World Bank and UNDP, the 
World Economic Forum Global Digital Divide Initiative, and agreements between the ITU and 
vendors such as Cisco and Oracle to bring training centers to poor countries (Campbell 2001). 
These initiatives typically share common goals and methods, consistent with the view 
that the key to building ICT use in developing countries was some kind of direct provision, 
investment, or demand-push from governments (see, for example, Kapur 2002).  InfoDev at the 
World Bank, for example, describes itself as “a multi-donor program supporting, through a 
competitive grant mechanism, innovative activities demonstrating the opportunities offered by 
new technologies in information and communications. Its mission is to utilize these technologies 
for economic and social development, with a special emphasis on the needs of the poor in 
                                                 
3   In a complementary paper, Clarke (2001) finds that foreign-owned firms are more likely to have Internet access.  
Moreover, he found evidence of spillovers from this access, with FDI increasing Internet access among domestic 
firms other than firm receiving the FDI. 
4   Heeks (2002) also notes that this is not necessarily good: “Like sharks drawn to blood in the ocean, a whole host 
of consultants, academics, vendors, and development organization staff have been drawn into the e-development 
arena by the scent of money.”         
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developing economies” (InfoDev 2002).  Funded projects and programs generally focus on 
directly providing the technology or training necessary to bring ICTs to the poor.
5 
Even if targeted projects achieve their goals, truly addressing the problem requires 
understanding factors underlying the divide.  Given the potential of ICTs in developing countries 
to improve growth and the resources already committed to addressing the issue, it is important to 
investigate whether certain obstacles make the divide worse than one would expect even given a 
country’s general economic situation.  A few papers have empirically explored ICT use in 
developing countries.  This work is generally based on data collected by the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU), and tends to find digital technologies correlated with the 
general level of development such as trade openness and income (Baliamoune 2002; Onyeiwu 
2002). 
The results from this literature are perhaps not surprising, but suggest that technology 
diffusion in developing countries may not be so different from other goods and services.  These 
papers do suffer from some shortcomings, however.  First, they include Internet users, Internet 
hosts, number of computers, telephone lines, and mobile telephone customers all as dependent 
variables.
6  While this choice is not necessarily incorrect, the resulting empirical specifications 
cannot control for many relevant necessary factors.  For example, as discussed below, the 
number of Internet users is likely to be (partly) a function of the development of the 
telecommunications infrastructure and the number of computers in the country.  Also, the 
analyses typically do not incorporate or acknowledge the collected knowledge of 
telecommunications reforms, which suggests that some measure of market structure and 
liberalization should be taken into account. 
                                                 
5   See http://www.infodev.org/index.html for lists of proposals and funded projects.  
6   Indeed, Onyeiwu (2002) combines these four variables into a single, “digitalization” index.         
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One notable exception is a study by Dasgupta, et al. (2001), who find that the digital 
divide is better characterized as a lack of telecommunications access than a lack of access to 
ICTs, per se.  As a result, competition policy proves to be important—countries with higher 
general scores on competition policy have higher Internet intensity (Internet subscriptions per 
telephone mainline).  Their conclusions are sensible given other work on telecommunications 
reforms in developing countries.  By now a great deal of research has demonstrated the benefits 
of competition in telecommunications (e.g., Ambrose, et al. 1990; Fink, et al. 2002; Li and Xu 
2001; Ros 1999; Wallsten 2001).  Nonetheless, their analysis uses a very general measure of 
overall “competitiveness” within a country—an index constructed in 1995 that measures on a 
scale of 1 to 6 whether “the state inhibits a competitive private sector, either through direct 
regulation or by reserving significant economic activities for state-controlled entities.” 
  In this paper I use data from a new survey of telecommunications regulators to assess the 
effects of targeted regulations on the development of the Internet.  Specifically, the data allows 
me to explore the effect of ISP regulations on Internet usage and access pricing, while 
controlling for other factors that one would expect to affect these variables.  In the sections 
below I discuss regulation and the Internet and then proceed to explain the data, empirical 
methods, and results. 
 
III.  Regulation and the Internet 
  Regulation is an important component of competition policy in the context of 
telecommunications.  A key problem in telecommunications reforms is that while competition is 
technically possible, new entrants require the cooperation of the incumbent firm, which often has 
nearly a complete monopoly.  In particular, a new entrant’s customers must be able to reach the         
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incumbent’s customers if the entrant’s network is to have any value.  In order to be viable, 
therefore, the entrant must be able to interconnect with the incumbent’s network.  Because a 
monopolist has no incentive to interconnect, and every incentive to exercise its market power at 
the expense of new entrants and consumers, most countries established regulatory agencies as 
part of their telecommunications reform process in large part to curb the incumbent’s market 
power and promote competition in the industry.  But the definition of “telecommunications” is 
not clear-cut, and regulatory discretion is rarely limited to interconnection issues.  In particular, 
in addition to telephony, some countries regulate aspects of the Internet, especially Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs). 
Regulatory discretion is not the only ambiguous feature of these agencies.  Whether 
regulatory agencies effectively correct market failures has been a hotly debated issue for several 
decades, as discussed below. 
Helping Hand, Capture, and the Grabbing Hand  
  In an ideal world, economic regulation is intended to correct market failures (Pigou’s 
(1938) “helping hand” theory).  For example, in industries considered to be natural 
monopolies—where increasing returns to scale mean that one firm can supply the market at 
lowest cost—a laissez-faire approach would ultimately result in a single firm dominating the 
market free to charge monopoly prices and providing lower quantities of the service.  The 
regulator was supposed to ensure that the firm kept costs down while continuing to innovate and 
improve service as if it operated in a competitive industry. 
  Regulations, however, can end up primarily benefit the regulated firm.  As Stigler (1971) 
pointed out, it is easy for the regulated firm to “capture” the regulator.  In this case, regulations 
can become a vehicle not for maximizing total or consumer welfare, but for protecting the firm’s         
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monopoly and profits.  It is easy to understand how such regulatory failure can happen, even 
assuming a benevolent regulator.  The firm always has more information about its cost structure 
than does the regulator, making it difficult for the regulator to independently evaluate the firm 
and the industry.  The firm can strategically control the information available to the regulator to 
increase the probability that decisions are in the firm’s favor.  Likewise, the regulator may 
impose entry barriers to the industry, either out of a belief that entry would be harmful or, if truly 
captured, simply to protect the incumbent.  In either case, the incumbent firms benefits from the 
regulation. 
Developing countries face an additional regulatory pitfall.  Regulatory agencies create 
more opportunities for governments to extend a “grabbing hand”—that is, they increase the 
number of interaction points between government and industry where bribes may be required for 
firms to begin or continue operations.  This pattern of administrative barriers imposed on firms in 
developing countries is becoming well-documented (e.g., de Soto 1989; Djankov, et al. 2002; 
Emery, et al. 2000; Friedman, et al. 2000).  These barriers impose real costs on developing 
economies.  Emery, et al. (2000) discovered that “when added together, this whole maze of often 
duplicative, complex, and non-transparent procedures can mean delays of up to two years to get 
investments approved and operational.”  Moreover, Djankov, et al. (2002) finds entry regulation 
in developing countries to be associated with lower quality public and private goods. 
The net effect of telecommunications regulation in developing countries is unclear.  On 
the one hand, regulatory agencies may be crucial in encouraging entry and investment in the face 
of a dominant incumbent.  On the other hand, the track record is not good.  Developing country 




Regulation and the Internet 
   The effects of regulation on telecommunications reforms in general have only begun to 
be extensively investigated.
7  Research, however, has almost completely ignored the effects of 
regulation on Internet development.  Many of the “digital divide” reports note that promoting 
competition and Internet-friendly regulatory policies are an important component of addressing 
the issue (e.g., International Labour Office 2001).  Nonetheless, to my knowledge no empirical 
study has explored the effects of regulation on the Internet in developing countries.  This 
omission is especially unfortunate given that regulatory agencies are likely to be the primary way 
public policy affects Internet development. 
  One case study on the subject highlights the potential importance of regulation on 
Internet development.  Petrazzini and Guerrero (2000) investigate development of the Internet in 
Argentina.  In particular, they try to explain Argentina’s progression from having among the 
lowest Internet penetration in Latin America in 1993 to among the highest in 1999.  Essentially, 
they find that regulatory intervention was key in that non-competitive market, with the 
government mandating large reductions in prices of leased lines and the creation of a special 
local dialing scheme for calls to connect to the Internet.  Even with those mandated reductions, 
however, the authors note that high prices still seemed to be a major obstacle to higher Internet 
penetration. 
  While the Argentina case study highlights the potential influence regulatory policy can 
have on Internet development, this paper aims to address this question empirically by exploiting 
a new, detailed dataset based on a survey of telecommunications regulators in 44 developing 
                                                 
7  Many researchers have discussed telecommunications regulation (e.g., Galal and Nauriyal 1995; Gasmi, et al. 
2000; Guasch and Hahn 1997; Hill and Abdala 1996; Noll 2000; Stiglitz 1999; Wallsten 2001; Wellenius and Stern 
1994).  To date, however, most analysis consists of case studies; there is very little empirical work on the issue.         
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countries.  As discussed below, the survey contained several questions on regulation of ISPs, 
which, combined with standard data from other sources allow me to test the effects of regulation 
on Internet development.  The following sections describe the data, empirical methods, and 
results. 
 
IV. Data and Empirical Analysis 
  The point of this paper is to measure the effects of regulation on the Internet in 
developing countries.  I do the analysis in the context of a simple regression framework, 
estimating several versions of equation (1). 
(1)   y = β0 + β1*(regulation) + β2Z + ε 
In this equation, the dependent variable y is the relevant Internet measure, regulation is the 
relevant regulation variable, and Z is a vector of control variables.  These are described in more 
detail below. 
The regulation variables—the heart of this paper—are derived from a survey of 
regulators in developing countries conducted from March 2001 to August 2001.  We contacted 
60 regulatory agencies in developing countries around the world and received responses from 45 
(see Wallsten, et al. 2002 for a complete description of the data).
8  The survey asked detailed 
questions about the agency’s independence, composition, appointment and removal processes, 
transparency, accountability, and discretion.  Several questions about the regulator’s discretion 
focused on ISPs, resulting in two useful regulation variables for this analysis.  First, the survey 
asked “What approval do Internet Service Providers have to get before they can start operating,” 
where possible answers were “none”, “notification”, and “formal approval.”  For the analysis I 
                                                 
8   We actually received 46 responses, but one returned the survey unanswered.         
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coded regulatory approval as a dummy variable that equals one if the operator requires formal 
approval to start operating, and zero otherwise.  Second, the survey asked whether “final-user 
prices [are] regulated” for ISPs.  Again, price regulation becomes a dummy variable that equals 
one if ISP prices are regulated.  Table 1 shows the results of these questions by country.  The 
table shows that of 38 countries that answered the question, 23 require formal approval for ISPs 
to start operation.  Of 41 countries that responded to the second question, six regulate final-user 
ISP prices. 
  The two Internet measures come from the ITU.  The two measures of Internet penetration 
include the number of Internet users and the number of Internet hosts (Table 2).  The number of 
Internet users is “based on reported estimates, derivations based on reported Internet Access 
Provider subscriber counts, or calculated by multiplying the number of hosts by an estimated 
multiplier” (International Telecommunications Union 2002c).  While imperfect, this estimate 
seems to be the best estimate of Internet use available.  The second variable, the number of 
Internet hosts, “refers to the number of computers in an economy that are directly linked to the 
worldwide Internet network.  This statistic is based on the country code in the host address and 
thus may not correspond with the actual physical location” (International Telecommunications 
Union 2002b).  The qualifier on the definition is likely the explanation for large variation in the 
number of hosts per country.  The problem is essentially that while each country is assigned an 
Internet identifier (e.g., .uk for Britain), there is no obligation for everyone in the country to use 
it, resulting in ambiguity regarding the physical location of a given host.
9  These issues result in 
strange anomalies in the data.  For example, while it is conceivable that Brazil had nearly 
                                                 
9    Any internet address registered as .com or .org, for example, is counted as being located in the United States.           
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663,000 Internet hosts in the year 2000, it is strains credulity to believe that Malawi—despite 
being one of the poorest countries in the world—had only one.
10 
  Data on Internet pricing also comes from the ITU.  The pricing information is the ISP 
charge, and is defined as “the costs associated with 30 off-peak hours of dial-up Internet time per 
month.  It is the monthly Internet subscription rate plus extra charges once free hours have been 
used up” (International Telecommunications Union 2002a).  While the measures of Internet use 
are available from the early 1990s for many countries, the price data are available only for 2001.  
The last column of Table 2 shows ISP charges that year for the countries in the sample, revealing 
large variation across countries. 
 The  vector  Z attempts to control for other factors affecting Internet usage and pricing.  In 
particular, it includes per capita income, development of the telecommunications industry 
(number of telephone mainlines), number of personal computers, whether the incumbent 
telecommunications provider has been privatized, and the share of trade in the economy.  The 
combination of income, telecommunications development, and ubiquity of personal computers is 
likely to be a good indicator of potential demand for Internet services—or at least the number of 
users as measured here.  The privatization variable provides some measure of whether the 
industry has been liberalized or is still run by the state.  Trade is included as a measure of 
international integration, under the assumption that countries that are more connected to the rest 
of the world are more likely to tolerate or promote Internet access.  Moreover, such openness 
measures are the one factor consistently significant in econometric analyses discussed above. 
  One potential problem here is the likely correlation between the control variables.  That 
is, the number of personal computers per capita in a country is likely to be determined in large 
                                                 
10  The reason for Malawi’s poor showing appears to be a dispute over Malawi’s Internet identifier, .mw.  Until 
recently Malawi was unable to use it, because it was being held by a “British-South African entrepreneur” (Blantyre 
2000).         
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part by a country’s per capita income.  Likewise, an enormous literature has explored the 
relationship between trade and income.  However, Internet use is likely to be a function of all 
these variables, meaning it would be a mistake to exclude them, and they are unlikely to be 
correlated with the regulatory variable of interest.  The implication of this collinearity is that 
interpreting the coefficients on the control variables may not be easy, but it should not affect the 
variables of interest and excluding them is likely to bias the coefficient on the regulation 
variable.  Nonetheless, I add control variables to each regression slowly both to see how 
including one variable affects the others, and to test the robustness of the results on the policy 
variables. 
Internet users and hosts 
  The first part of the analysis explores the relationship between regulations and Internet 
penetration by estimating equation (2), which is similar to equation (1) except that the data exist 
over time and across countries. 
(2)  y = β0 + β1*(formal approval required for ISP to operate?)i + β2Zit + γt + εit 
The first set of regressions uses the number of Internet users per capita as the dependent variable, 
and the second set of regressions uses the number of Internet hosts per capita as the dependent 
variable.  The control variables are the ones described above, though the panel nature of the data 
means that I can also control for year fixed effects.  This time trend is an especially important 
control with a new technology such as the Internet, which is growing rapidly over time. 
Note that the regulation variable does not vary over time.  The survey was conducted in 
2001, and I assume that this regulatory function was in place from the time the regulatory agency 
was founded.  In one sense this is a bad assumption.  The Chilean regulatory agency, for 
example, was founded in 1977 and is unlikely to have considered regulations regarding a         
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technology that, from the point of view of a telecommunications authority, did not yet exist.  In a 
practical sense, however, this assumption is reasonable for two reasons.  First, the first year any 
country in the sample reports Internet users is 1991 (in Brazil, which had 5,000), and more 
commonly not until 1995 or 1996, meaning that the analysis never includes an observation that 
assumes Internet regulation to exist absurdly early.  Second, most regulatory agencies were 
formed around the same time the Internet was becoming popular and countries were already 
considering its implications, making it likely that these regulations were part of the regulatory 
agency’s purview from its inception.  The implication of this discussion is that the dataset 
becomes an unbalanced panel, where an observation is a country-year, and the first year a 
country appears in the regression is the first year the regulatory agency was operating. 
Table 3 reports the results of estimating equation (2) with the number of Internet users 
per capita as the dependent variable.  Interpreting the coefficients on the control variables is not 
easy, as discussed above, though broadly speaking the results are consistent with expectations.  
The number of telephone mainlines per capita is positively and significantly associated with 
Internet users, though it becomes insignificant as other variables are added.  The coefficient on 
per capita income is negative, though significant only in some specifications.  It is well-known 
that the most important determinant of telecommunications development, however, is income, so 
it is not surprising that including both of those variables together makes interpreting them 
difficult.  The number of personal computers per capita is robustly positively correlated with 
Internet use, and having a privatized telecommunications incumbent is also positively and 
significantly associated with Internet use. 
The regulatory variable is negatively and significantly associated with per capita Internet 
use across all specifications.  That is, countries that require ISPs to get formal regulatory         
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approval to start operations have fewer Internet users per capita than countries that allow ISPs to 
begin operations without such formal approval.  Moreover, the coefficient is not only negative, 
but also fairly large in magnitude at just about half the mean of the dependent variable.  
  Table 4 shows the results of estimating equation (2) when the dependent variable is 
Internet hosts per capita.  The results on the control variables are basically the same as described 
above.  The coefficient on the regulation variable, however, while always negative, ranges from 
being significant at the one percent level when in the regression by itself and also controlling for 
income (and year dummies), to not significant at all when including mainlines per capita, 
privatized incumbent, and personal computers per capita. 
  A slightly different specification, however, yields more robust results.  Table 5 shows the 
results of estimating equation (2) using log-levels.  In this specification, the regulation variable is 
robustly negative across specifications.  Even including any combination of income, GDP, 
population, number of telephone lines, privatized incumbent, number of personal computers, and 
trade variables, requiring formal approval for ISPs to start operations is correlated with fewer 
Internet hosts per capita.
11  Using logs is arguably more sensible in this case given the very large 
variation in reported number of Internet hosts.  Nonetheless, the large error inherent in the 
measurement of this indicator discussed above suggests that the results in general may be less 
reliable than for other variables. 
ISP Final-User Prices 
  Equation (3) presents the equation to be estimated using the price of monthly ISP access 
as the dependent variable, and whether or not ISP final-user prices are regulated as the policy 
variable of interest. 
                                                 
11   The results are, not surprisingly, equally robust when using log-levels without normalizing by population (that is, 




(3)  y = β0 + β1*(ISP final-user prices regulated?)i + β2Zi + εi 
While the Internet penetration variables used above are available for several years, ISP prices are 
reported only for the year 2001.  Unfortunately, not all of the control variables are yet available 
for that year for all countries, so I use year 2000 figures for those variables.  The result is a cross-
section of 29 countries using variables from 2000 and 2001. 
  Table 6 shows the results of this estimation.  None of the control variables are significant 
across specifications.  There is some evidence that a larger number of personal computers is 
correlated with lower ISP prices, but the coefficient is barely significant, at best.  The regulatory 
variable, however, is positive and statistically significant across specifications.  In other words, 
Internet access is more expensive in countries that regulate final-user ISP prices. 
V. Discussion  and  Conclusion 
  The prospect of a growing “digital divide” between poor and rich countries and hope that 
ICTs may present an opportunity to improve productivity and economic growth has led to a 
number of initiatives designed to stimulate ICT use in developing countries.  While many 
organizations note that competition and a friendly regulatory environment may be important to 
ICT development, few of these initiatives and very little research has actually focused on the role 
of regulation in promoting Internet use.  This paper is an attempt to fill that gap.  Using data 
from a new survey of telecommunications regulators in developing countries combined with 
publicly-available information from the ITU and the World Bank, I find regulation of Internet 
Service Providers to be correlated with worse outcomes.  In particular, countries that require 
ISPs to get formal approval before beginning operations have fewer Internet users and Internet 
hosts, while ISP price regulation is correlated with higher ISP final-user prices.         
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  One potential concern with the analysis is whether the regulatory variables are 
endogenously correlated with the dependent variables.  While this is a concern in a great deal of 
similar work on telecommunications reforms, reverse causality is unlikely to be the case here.  
First, these regulations were set largely in the early days of the technology’s introduction into the 
country.  In other words, the regulations probably came before the Internet was so ubiquitous, 
not the other way around.  Second, the empirical results are consistent with many governments’ 
initial reaction to the Internet, which was apprehension.  More repressive governments worried 
about the effects of free access to information, and nearly all governments worried about the 
effects of Internet telephony on their incumbent telecommunications provider.
12  In this light, 
ISP regulations were likely promulgated precisely in order to suppress Internet access, and in 
that light, seems to have been successful. 
  These results suggest that regulations on the Internet are not intended to correct market 
failures, and are more consistent with a capture or “grabbing hand” view of regulation.  Price 
regulation correlated with higher prices is consistent with capture, and requiring formal approval 
for ISP operations consistent with both capture and grabbing hands.  Requiring formal regulatory 
approval presents a barrier to entry to new ISPs.  The finding that this entry barrier is correlated 
with lower development of the industry is also consistent with Djankov’s (2002) finding that 
countries with heavier entry regulations have lower quality public and private goods. 
The results also suggest that a country’s regulatory approach to the Internet and ICTs can 
have a large impact on its ubiquity throughout the country.  While the sample contains a 
relatively small number of countries, the results suggest that reducing entry barriers and 
promoting competition is likely to yield large increases in the share of developing countries’ 
                                                 
12   I tried including various measures of civil liberties (e.g., from Freedom House) and corruption in the empirical 
analyses, but they were generally not significant.  Moreover, because such indicators are not available for all 
countries over all years their inclusion caused the sample size to shrink substantially.         
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populations with access to the Internet and any potential benefits that flow from such access.  In 
other words, removing entry barriers and promoting ISP competition may present a low-cost and 
non-distortionary way to boost Internet use in developing countries. 
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Low income countriesTable 1










Argentina 1990 Formal No
Barbados 2001 Formal No
Belize 1987 n/a Yes
Bolivia 1995 Notification No
Bosnia and Herzegovina 2001 Notification n/a
Brazil 1997 None No
Bulgaria 1998 None No
Chile 1977 None No
Colombia 1994 Formal No
Costa Rica 1996 Formal n/a
Cote d'Ivoire 1995 Formal Yes
Czech Republic 2000 Notification No
Dominican Republic 1998 Formal No
Ecuador 1995 Formal No
El Salvador 1996 None No
Estonia 1998 Notification No
Ghana 1996 Formal No
Guatemala 1996 Formal No
Honduras 1995 Formal No
Hungary 1990 Formal No
India 1997 Formal No
Jamaica 1997 Formal No
Jordan 1995 Formal Yes
Kenya 1999 Formal No
Latvia 1992 n/a No
Malawi 1998 Formal Yes
Malaysia 1998 None No
Mexico 1996 Notification No
Moldova 0 None No
Mongolia 1995 Formal No
Morocco 1998 n/a No
Pakistan 1996 Notification No
Panama 1996 Formal No
Peru 1991 Formal No
Poland 2000 Notification No
Romania 2001 Formal No
Slovakia 1993 Notification No
South Africa 2000 Formal No
Sri Lanka 1991 Formal Yes
Tanzania 1993 None Yes
Thailand 2001 n/a n/a
Turkey 2000 n/a No
Uganda 1997 n/a No
Venezuela 1991 Formal NoTable 2
Internet Users, Hosts, and Access Prices
(users and hosts in 2000, prices in 2001)







Argentina 2,500,000 67.51 175,303 4.73 77.90
Barbados 10,000 37.45 79 0.30 n/a
Belize 15,000 62.50 291 1.21 n/a
Bolivia 120,000 14.41 1,438 0.17 n/a
Bosnia and Herzegovina 40,000 10.06 722 0.18 19.34
Brazil 5,000,000 29.34 662,910 3.89 n/a
Bulgaria 430,000 52.65 15,353 1.88 7.75
Chile 2,537,308 166.80 51,380 3.38 n/a
Colombia 878,000 20.76 42,927 1.01 0.01
Costa Rica 228,000 59.83 8,882 2.33 16.00
Cote d'Ivoire 40,000 2.50 594 0.04 183.29
Czech Republic 1,000,000 97.34 138,060 13.44 0.00
Dominican Republic 159,000 18.99 7,841 0.94 17.97
Ecuador 180,000 14.23 2,106 0.17 n/a
El Salvador 50,000 7.97 1,018 0.16 25.96
Estonia 391,600 286.05 35,773 26.13 n/a
Ghana 30,000 1.55 119 0.01 36.00
Guatemala 80,000 7.03 2,894 0.25 n/a
Honduras 40,000 6.23 123 0.02 15.00
Hungary 715,000 70.04 129,587 12.69 12.74
India 5,500,000 5.41 32,991 0.03 10.01
Jamaica 80,000 30.38 592 0.22 49.25
Jordan 127,317 26.05 709 0.15 23.94
Kenya 200,000 6.65 949 0.03 65.56
Latvia 150,000 63.24 15,773 6.65 28.52
Malawi 15,000 1.45 1 0.00 n/a
Malaysia 3,700,000 159.00 64,081 2.75 5.26
Mexico 2,712,375 27.69 495,747 5.06 10.69
Moldova 52,600 12.28 1,713 0.40 33.31
Mongolia 30,000 12.51 168 0.07 51.50
Morocco 200,000 6.97 951 0.03 26.34
Pakistan 133,875 0.97 5,487 0.04 12.61
Panama 90,000 31.51 2,915 1.02 n/a
Peru 2,500,000 97.42 9,967 0.39 n/a
Poland 2,800,000 72.45 259,511 6.71 0.00
Romania 800,000 35.66 29,662 1.32 15.00
Slovakia 650,000 120.33 31,753 5.88 8.51
South Africa 2,400,000 56.07 184,547 4.31 8.50
Sri Lanka 121,500 6.28 1,754 0.09 6.49
Tanzania 115,000 3.41 536 0.02 69.00
Thailand 2,300,000 37.87 53,683 0.88 8.98
Turkey 2,000,000 30.63 108,410 1.66 1.35
Uganda 40,000 1.80 159 0.01 30.00
Venezuela 950,000 39.30 15,658 0.65 n/a
* Access charge is number of US dollars for 30 off-peak hours of Internet time per month




Regulation and Internet Users
Dependent Variable: Internet Users per million people
Mean of dependent variable: 17857 19232
Formal approval required by ISP? -8,261.859 -8,737.642 -6,961.854 -6,608.000 -6,611.632
(1.99)* (2.07)* (1.98)* (1.90)+ (1.95)+
Telephone mainlines per 100 people 2,065.406 1,920.932 -188.177 -14.794 -376.557
(9.45)** (6.34)** (0.60) (0.05) (1.12)
GDP per capita 0.980 -2.448 -3.706 -1.254
(0.69) (2.06)* (2.87)** (0.83)
Personal computers per million people 1.013 1.015 0.932
(10.64)** (10.82)** (9.73)**
Incumbent privatized? 8,827.408 6,775.936
(2.33)* (1.81)+
Trade as share of GDP 145.625
(2.94)**
Constant -14,196.594 -16,347.968 7,795.502 2,094.340 -11,140.177
(0.54) (0.61) (0.37) (0.10) (0.53)
Observations 181 181 165 165 165
R-squared 0.52 0.52 0.73 0.74 0.75
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
year dummies includedTable 4
Regulation and Internet Hosts Per Capita
Dependent variable: Internet hosts per million people
Mean of dependent variable: 1190.56 1295.427
Formal approval required by ISP? -1,386.972 -1,222.210 -404.048 -196.327 -361.857 -129.819
(2.90)** (2.80)** (1.04) (0.50) (0.95) (0.35)
gdpcap 0.648 -0.076 -0.290 -0.259 -0.506
(5.90)** (0.57) (2.18)* (1.78)+ (3.58)**
lines 214.209 84.213 240.092 112.005





Constant 956.625 -1,020.359 -1,530.912 -950.265 -1,881.465 -1,374.777
(0.96) (1.06) (1.84)+ (0.98) (2.28)* (1.47)
Observations 172 172 172 155 172 155
R-squared 0.14 0.29 0.48 0.59 0.50 0.62
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year dummies Included
Table 5
Regulation and log of Internet hosts per capita
Dependent variable: log(hosts per capita + 1)
Mean of dep var 4.95 4.99
Formal approval required by ISP? -0.941 -0.686 -0.460 -0.475 -0.630
(2.47)* (4.08)** (2.82)** (2.88)** (4.05)**
lngdpcap 2.171 1.494 1.574 0.968
(25.57)** (9.40)** (8.45)** (4.32)**






Constant 3.861 -12.819 -9.638 -9.992 -11.807
(5.48)** (17.75)** (10.32)** (9.72)** (11.25)**
Observations 165 165 165 165 152
R-squared 0.14 0.83 0.86 0.86 0.88
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Year dummies includedTable 6
Price Regulation and Internet Access Prices in 2000
Dependent variable: 30 off-peak hours of dial-up Internet time per month
Mean of dependent variable 28.7055 29.08
ISP prices regulated? 48.690 46.448 40.453 42.992 42.336 40.003 39.954 36.385 37.166
(2.74)* (2.46)* (2.14)* (2.24)* (2.15)* (2.03)+ (2.02)+ (1.88)+ (1.79)+
GDP per capita -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.002 0.001
(0.41) (0.67) (0.27) (0.34) (0.07) (0.49) (0.55) (0.18)
Telephone mainlines per 100 people -1.065
(1.44)
Number telephone mainlines (millions) -.9409402  -.8668842  -1.337605  -3.238662  -3.488897  -2.737031
(0.99) (0.86) (1.24) (1.33) (1.47) (1.05)
Incumbent privatized 3.778 3.197 0.001 2.849 0.983
(0.26) (0.22) (0.00) (0.19) (0.06)
Trade as a share of GDP -0.175 -0.123 0.000 -0.077
(1.16) (0.75) (0.00) (0.41)
GDP (milions USD) 134.3397 438.5419 93.95396
(0.87) (1.93)+ (0.56)
Number personal computers per thousand people -.2069728 
(0.72)
Number personal computers (millions) -24.59824
(1.82)+
Constant 21.990 25.413 31.846 28.891 26.981 42.710 42.107 33.964 40.407
(3.33)** (2.38)* (2.80)** (2.57)* (1.97)+ (2.22)* (2.18)* (1.73)+ (1.97)+
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 28 28
R-squared 0.22 0.22 0.28 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.32 0.42 0.34
Absolute value of t statistics in parentheses
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%